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Abstract 
Recent research suggests that an additional $1 of health aid would displace ± or 
crowd out ± QHDUO\WKHVDPHDPRXQWLQDUHFLSLHQWJRYHUQPHQWV¶RZQKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUH
Implementing a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) may exacerbate crowding out because 
recipient governments should face fewer constraints when allocating health aid. This paper 
uses rigorous panel data methods to investigate this hypothesised effect of SWAp. We find 
that SWAp provides not an exacerbating but a potentially protective effect, reducing 
displacement of government health expenditure. This suggests some aid dollars are more 
fungible than others, and the mechanism for aid delivery makes a difference.  
1. Introduction 
 
Empirical evidence shows that an additional $1 of health aid does not lead to an additional 
$1 spent on health. Rather Dieleman, Graves, and Hanlon (2013) estimated that over the 
period 1995 to 2010 an additional $1 of health aid channelled to government on average 
reduced WKDWJRYHUQPHQW¶VRZQKHDOWKexpenditure from domestic revenues by about $0.86. 
This same period saw development agencies, donors, and aid recipients advocate for and 
achieve dramatic increases in development assistance for health (DAH); ostensibly to assist 
countries address significant population health problems and health inequalities between 
(and within) countries (Lu et al., 2010; Ravishankar et al., 2009). The effective treatment of 
this health aid as almost entirely fungible has been viewed by some as a failure of 
government to take responsibility for the health of their people, and indeed as a threat to the 
sustainability of aid supported programmes (Leiderer, 2012; Lu et al., 2010).  
 
The potential for health aid to be less than fully additional arises where the recipient 
government views aid as a replacement for domestic revenues such as taxation or user fees 
that would otherwise have been spent on health. The donor allocates aid with the intention 
of increasing spending on health but a reallocation of domestic funds means that the overall 
increase in spending is shared between health and other sectors (McGillivray & Morrissey, 
2000)7KLVµUHDOORFDWLRQ¶µGLVSODFHPHQW¶RUµFURZGLQJRXW¶RIGRPHVWLF health expenditure 
may be a rational response to an increase in health aid when donor and recipient 
government priorities are misaligned (McGillivray & Morrissey, 2000; Ooms et al., 2010), or 
an approach to managing fluctuating health aid receipts (Ooms et al., 2010). Nonetheless, 
donors may seek to influence or constrain recipient allocations if their aid contributions are 
redirected to priorities they do not share (McGillivray & Morrissey, 2000), or to serve the 
LQWHUHVWVRIORFDOµHOLWHV¶(Leiderer, 2012).  
 
The available empirical evidence suggests that the potential for health aid to crowd out 
recipient government health expenditure is very real (Dieleman, Graves & Hanlon, 2013; 
Dieleman & Hanlon, 2014; Farag, Nandakumar, Wallack, Gaumer, & Hodgkin, 2009; Lu et 
al., 2010), although Van de Sijpe (2013) argues the extent to which health aid is fungible is 
exaggerated. However, this same evidence suggests that the extent of crowding out might 
be modifiable. For example, Lu et al. (2010) report crowding out (of just less than 100%) for 
DAH directed via recipient governments but DµIO\SDSHUHIIHFW¶IRUdirectly delivered aid. 
8QGHUWKHµIO\SDSHUHIIHFW¶DGGLWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWFRQWUROOHGIXQGVµVWLFN¶WRincreases in DAH 
such that $1 of directly delivered aid for HIV yields a more than $1 increase in HIV funding 
(Leiderer, 2012; Pettersson, 2007). A number of previous studies have reported a similar 
difference in the apparent behavioural response to aid delivered via recipient governments 
and non-government agents (Dieleman et al., 2013; Farag et al., 2009; Lu et al., 2010).  
 
Theoretical explanations also suggest that the magnitude and direction of any effect may 
depend upon the mechanism for aid delivery (Leiderer, 2012; Torsvik, 2005). Intuitively, 
untied grants allow full flexibility for the recipient government to direct grant monies into 
finance of programs that would have been funded anyway (out of domestic revenues). Tied 
grants might carry a lower risk of crowding out because donors can designate funds to 
programs that are not currently being undertaken and that are unlikely to be undertaken by a 
recipient government left to its own devices. Thus the mode of aid delivery may be 
particularly important for development partners when considering the opportunity and 
incentive for displacement.  
 
The most prominent mode of health aid delivery remains project-based (Piva & Dodd, 2009; 
Ravishankar et al., 2009), the large increases of which post 1990 created very fragmented 
aid programmes, entailing high transaction costs and reducing aid effectiveness (Buse & 
Walt, 1997; Hill, 2002; Walt, Pavignani, Gilson & Buse, 1999). Project-based aid has been 
further criticised for ignoring domestic health priorities and working in paral
support of government health services, including luring away skilled health care workers 
(Dieleman et al., 2014; Esser & Bench, 2011; Knack & Rahman, 2007). 
 
A global response to such concerns came in the shape of the Aid Effectiveness Agenda, 
encapsulated in the Paris Declaration principles for effective aid delivery. Widely endorsed 
by donors, the Paris Declaration called for greater coordination among donors, who as a 
group should deliver aid through domestically owned health sector plans, addressing local 
health priorities, whilst strengthening recipient government capacity to manage aid 
programmes (Organisation for Economic Cooperation & Development [OECD], 2010). The 
most prominent formal manifestation of aid effectiveness principles in the health sector has 
been the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) (Peters & Chao, 1998; Peters, Paina & 
Schleimann, 2013; Sundewall & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006).   
 
Whilst the aim of donor coordination via SWAp (or SWAp-like mechanisms) is to improve aid 
outcomes (eg. in terms of poverty reduction, population health improvements, economic 
growth), Torsvik (2005) warned that coordinating donors may intensify the crowding out 
problem. He showed theoretically that, if a unified group of donors is sufficiently concerned 
with the wellbeing of the poor, the recipient government may be more likely to pursue other 
priorities with government funds. ConditiRQDODQGHQIRUFHDEOHFRQWUDFWVWKDW³UH-DOLJQ´
recipient priorities may prevent this.  
 
SWAps have been found to significantly increase levels of health aid delivered as untied 
sector support (Sweeney & Mortimer, 2016). With this emphasis on untied aid and recipient 
(rather than donor) control over aid disbursements, it is plausible then that a SWAp may 
increase crowding out of recipient government health expenditures. However, it is also 
plausible that SWAps may reduce the likelihood of displacement. Examples exist of where 
health SWAp agreements have used contracts to cement health expenditure commitments 
from government and donors alike (Ulikpan, Mirzoev, Jimenez, Malik & Hill, 2014). Further, a 
decision to implement a health SWAp may represent the commencement of a period of 
strengthening health sector governance, including the capacity to work with and negotiate 
with both donors and finance ministries on a more equal footing. Certainly strengthening 
sector governance is an important aim of SWAps and evidence from case studies suggests 
that such improvements are achievable (Vaillancourt, 2009).  
 
Hence the net effect of SWAp implementation on the magnitude and direction of crowding 
out is an empirical question ± and one that has hitherto not been assessed. This paper 
seeks to fill this gap by empirically estimating the magnitude and direction of crowding out or 
displacement, with and without SWAp. In Section 2, we briefly set out a conceptual 
framework of displacement. Section 3 outlines our empirical approach, specifying panel data 
regressions to estimate the potentially moderating effect of SWAps on health aid 
displacement of government health expenditure using cross-country panel data from 1995-
2012. In Sections 4 and 5 we present and discuss the results of the empirical models 
wherein increases in health aid appear to displace government health expenditure, but at a 
lower rate in SWAp settings than in non-SWAp settings. 
 
The research has potentially important development policy implications. Many donors wish 
to curtail the extent of crowding out, concerned that displaced funds are being put to 
inappropriate, even corrupt use (Kolstad, 2005; Leiderer, 2012).1 Further, despite persistent 
underspending on population health, growth in health aid has plateaued; and evidence 
suggests governments do not replace government expenditure in response to a drop in 
health aid at the same rate as it is displaced when health aid is increasing (Dieleman & 
Hanlon, 2014; Leach-Kemon et al., 2012).  Even during the period of rapidly increasing 
health aid post 1990, total health expenditure remained very low in many countries, and was 
GHHPHG³LQVXIILFLHQWWRHQVXUHXQLYHUVDODFFHVVWRHYHQDEDVLFVHWRIKHDOWKVHUYLFHV´
(World Health Organisation [WHO], 2010, p.31). Thus it is crucial that we gain a better 
understanding of policies that may help or hinder donors and recipient governments as they 
attempt to optimise their investments in population health.  
 
2. Background - Theoretical explanation of crowding out 
This section provides a brief conceptual framework to illustrate the two opposing theoretical 
predictions regarding the effect of SWAps on DAH displacement of government health 
VSHQGLQJ)LJXUHGHSLFWVWKHUHFLSLHQWJRYHUQPHQW¶VWUDGH-off between expenditures in the 
health sector versus other sectors. The recipient government commences at point A, with 
WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VLQGLIIHUHnce curve (reflecting the relative weight given to public investment 
in the health sector versus other sectors) tangent to the budget constraint RR. Direct delivery 
of aid specifically for the health sector (DAH) would shift the budget constraint to the right 
and full additionality would entail an increase in funding for health by the full amount of the 
grant (a shift from point A to B). However, in the comparison between point B and other 
feasible allocations on the new budget constraint, the recipient government can reach a 
higher indifference curve by allocating the available pool of funds (R+DAH) to reflect their 
preferences across health sector and other sector activities (I2 at point C), leaving the 
proportional allocation between health and other sectors exactly as it was before receipt of 
additional DAH. In this example the allocation of DAH leads to an increase in health sector 
spending, but not by the full amount of DAH as perhaps donors intended ± again reflecting a 
difference in preferences between donor and recipient government. The extent to which 
additional DAH is allocated to the health sector will depend on the relative slopes of 
indifference curves and the budget constraint. This analysis can also be applied at the micro- 
or meso-level of allocations across disease-areas or specific programmes. For example, 
DAH tied to HIV programmes may result in government shifting its own spending from HIV to 
other health sector priorities.  
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE  
 
 Theoretical explanations for the flypaper effect include the presence of non-budgetary 
FRQVWUDLQWVWKDWOLPLWWKHUHFLSLHQWJRYHUQPHQW¶VDELOLW\WRGLVEXUVHIXQGVRQSDUWLFXODUW\SHV
of projects (Brooks & Phillips, 2010). Other explanations for the fly-paper effect derive from 
reductions in the relative prices of goods and services (such as medicines, labour or health 
services) delivered as aid in-kind but that are also exchanged in domestic markets 
(McGillivray & Morrissey, 2001). A fall in relative prices may arise if goods and services 
delivered as aid in-kind are offered at less than market prices, or if aid in-kind is provided in 
sufficient quantities to force down market prices (McGillivray & Morrissey, 2001). Given a 
sufficiently large change in relative prices, allocating the available pool of funds in line with 
recipient preferences may nonetheless result in an increase in health sector spending by 
more than the full amount of DAH. McGillvray and Morrissey (2001) note that perceived 
changes in relative prices and other types of µDLGLOOXVLRQ¶ may provoke a similar behavioural 
response from recipients; providing yet another possible explanation for the fly-paper effect.  
 
3 Empirical Approach  
3.1 Main specification 
The main specification Equation (1) employs a difference-in-differences approach to identify 
the moderating effect of SWAp implementation on health aid displacement of government 
health expenditure. Specifically, we estimate:  
 
(1) GHE-Sit  Įi ȕ1DAHGit ȕ2DAHNGit + į1SWApit + į2SWApit*DAHGit + 
į3SWApit*DAHNGit ȕ3GGEit + ȕ4GDPit ȕ5HIVit + ut İit  
 
where GHE-S is government health expenditure (sourced from government revenues) in 
country i in year t. SWAp is a dummy treatment variable denoting the presence of a health 
SWAp in country i in year t. DAHG and DAHNG are development assistance for health (or 
health aid) channelled to the respective government and non-government sectors of country i 
in year t. The main parameter of interest is į2, the interaction effect between SWAp and DAHG; 
capturing the modifying effect of SWAp status on the extent to which DAHG displaces recipient 
government health expenditure. į3 captures the modifying effect of SWAp status on the extent 
to which DAHNG (DAH that bypasses government) displaces (or increases) government 
health expenditure.2 For each interaction term (į2 and į3), the relevant DAH component has 
first been demeaned using the sample mean. The resulting interpretation of į2, for example, is 
the impact of increasing DAHG (beyond average levels) on GHE-S when a SWAp is in place.  
 
GGE is general government non-health expenditure, which captures broader changes in 
government fiscal policies and spending. GDP (per capita) and HIV death rates (per 100,000 
population) are included as potential confounding variables, since they influence both levels 
of government health expenditure as well as need for health expenditure (Dieleman et al., 
2013; Dieleman & Hanlon, 2014; Lu et al., 2010; Van de Sijpe, 2013). HIV deaths per 100,000 
population are controlled for because some countries with high HIV burden have been 
committing increased yearly budgets to addressing this health burden (Amico, Aran & Avila, 
2010; Lu et al., 2010). Country fixed effects (Įi) and year effects (ut) capture additional country-
specific determinants of health expenditure and global trends. İ
 
is the random error term. All 
financial variables were included as proportions of GDP, except GDP per capita, which was 
logged to ease interpretation (as were HIV death rates). 
 
In preliminary robustness analyses, we tested sensitivity to the use of alternative measures of 
HIV prevalence and included additional controls into the specification. First, infant mortality 
rate (IMR, per 1,000 live births) was included as an important measure of population health 
status and thus a measure of health expenditure need. IMR was not included in the main 
specification because IMR may represent an intermediate outcome in the causal chain 
between DAH and GHE. Following Lu et al. (2010) and Dieleman et al. (2013) debt relief 
(which also includes significant missing data) is included as some debt relief initiatives have 
placed conditions on beneficiaries to increase government expenditures on health and 
education (Lu et al., 2010). Finally, World Bank governance indicators of perceived 
government effectiveness and control of corruption are included as they may influence GHE, 
but also to control for any remaining differences between the SWAp treatment and control 
groups after sample selection (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2010). 
  
3.2 Data sources and limitations  
SWAp data was identified via the International Health Partnerships Plus (IHP+) Country 
Planning Cycle Database (IHP+, 2011) and a search of grey and peer-reviewed literature 
(see Sweeney, Mortimer & Johnston, 2014a, b). Data for other variables were obtained from 
IHME, WHO and World Bank databases. The compiled dataset for our main analysis spans 
1995-2012. The IHME DAHG and DAHNG data are used because documented attempts are 
made to differentiate between DAH that is on-budget (i.e. channelled via recipient 
government), and DAH that is off-budget (i.e. where donors fund endeavours to benefit the 
recipient country - such as activities of non-government agencies or technical advisors 
based in the donor country, but these funds are not channelled via the recipient government) 
(Dieleman, Graves et al. 2013). A number of difficulties in tracking DAH flows and attributing 
these flows to government or non-government channels have previously been identified in 
the literature, such that the distinction between on and off-budget aid may not be entirely 
accurate (Van de Sijpe, 2013a, b). For example, DAHG could include aid that is not 
associated with, or even known to, the government.  Though the extent of measurement 
error in DAHG and DAHNG data is contested in the literature (e.g. Dieleman et al., 2013; 
Van de Sijpe, 2013a, b), the possibility of large magnitude errors in identifying off-budget and 
on-budget aid cannot be excluded (Van de Sijpe, 2013a, b).  
 
For our main analysis, we specify the component of government health expenditure out of 
domestically sourced revenues (i.e. excluding health aid): GHE-S, as the dependent 
variable. This is intended to facilitate ready comparison against previous estimates of the 
fungibility of health aid (Dieleman et al., 2013; Lu et al., 2010). However, GHE-S is a 
constructed variable, derived by subtracting levels of DAHG from World Health Organisation 
(WHO) data on government health expenditure as the agent (GHE-A). This is done because 
GHE-A includes health aid channelled via the government. Following the debate in the 
literature, this procedure carries the risk of propagating any measurement error in DAHG to 
the dependent variable. Any such errors in identifying off-budget and on-budget aid have the 
potential to bias estimated coefficients on DAHG, DAHNG, and their interactions with SWAp.   
In supplementary analyses, we test sensitivity of our results to measurement error in GHE-S, 
DAHG and DAHNG (see Section 3.4 and Supplementary Materials for details). 
 
3.3 Sample selection 
Countries were included if they had at least 16 of a possible 18 complete annual 
observations, including a 1995 (baseline) observation. A complete observation was defined 
as containing data for all of GHE-S, DAHG, DAHNG, SWAp, GDP, and GDP/capita. Zambia 
was excluded from analysis as their SWAp commenced before the first available GHE-S 
observation. India and China were excluded from analyses because their immense scale 
makes a country-wide SWAp very unlikely. 
  
The key underlying assumption in Equation (1) is that both the SWAp implementing and 
control country groups would have had similar trends in GHE-S in the absence of any SWAp 
implementation. However, preliminary comparisons of observable baseline (1995) country 
characteristics reveal that SWAp implementing countries (prior to implementation) were 
much poorer and with worse health indicators than non-implementing countries (see 
Supplementary Materials). If trends in GHE-S depend upon initial conditions, then 
differences at baseline threaten the common trends assumption required for valid estimation 
using a difference-in-differences approach. To minimise this risk, we select a set of well-
matched treatment and control country groups, prior to estimating Equation (1). A linear 
probability model was used to estimate the propensity for a country to implement a SWAp at 
any point over the period 1996 to 2012, using 1995 (baseline) levels of government health 
expenditure (GHE-A)KHDOWKDLG'$+DQGQXPEHURIGRQRUVDQGSUR[LHVIRUµQHHG¶
(GDP/capita, IMR, life expectancy, HIV deaths), as well as population size and geographic 
regional dummies (see section A of Supplementary Materials for full results). Countries with 
a propensity score of greater than 0.24 (the lower bound of SWAp implementing countries) 
were included in the sample, thereby excluding those countries least likely to ever implement 
a SWAp. Table 1 lists the countries selected for inclusion by this criterion (along with SWAp 
commencement year). To assess the importance of sample selection decisions, Equation (1) 
is re-estimated with both tighter and broader (propensity score) inclusion criteria applied, in 
some cases significantly increasing the size of the control group (see results in 
Supplementary Materials). 
 
 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In addition to the rigorous approach taken to identify well-matched treatment and control 
groups, we investigate likely adherence to the common trends assumption. Given available 
GHE-A (and consequently GHE-S) observations only commence in 1995, we employ an 
alternative dataset of public health expenditure that has GHE-A estimates enabling the 
FRQVWUXFWLRQRIDSDQHOIURPWRSULRUWRDQ\LQFOXGHGFRXQWU\¶V6:$S
implementation (International Food Policy Research Institute [IFPRI], 2015). The main 
limitation of this dataset is that it is only available for a smaller subset of countries. However, 
it does allow some investigation for any pre-existing differences in GHE-S trends over a 
seven-year period prior to any included SWAp uptake. Two tests (described and presented 
in full in Section C of Supplementary Materials) are then undertaken to compare pre-SWAp 
GHE-S trends between the treatment and control groups.  
 
An endogenous relationship between the SWAp treatment variable and the dependent 
variable may exist. However, the direction of any potentially resulting bias is not entirely 
obvious. On the one hand, SWAp has been described as best suited to settings where there 
is both significant need for aid and also a relatively effective government with sound health 
sector policies (Brown, Foster, Norton & Nachold, 2001). It is plausible that a country 
observing higher baseline and ongoing increasing trends in GHE-S may indicate such a 
setting. In such a case, increasing GHE-S may increase the likelihood of SWAp 
implementation. Increasing GHE-S may also provide encouragement for donors considering 
VXSSRUWLQJDFRXQWU\¶V6:$SLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ$OWHUQDWLYHO\VWHDGLO\LQFUHDVLQJ*+(-S 
(driven by increasing expenditure of domestically sourced revenues) will result in DAHG 
EHFRPLQJDVPDOOHUFRPSRQHQWRIDJRYHUQPHQW¶VWRWDOKHDOWKH[SHQGLWXUHSURJUDPPH
(GHE-$$WVRPHSRLQWWKLVOLNHO\PHDQVPDQDJLQJRQH¶VKHDOWKDLGSURJUDPPHEHFRPHV
less burdensome, making SWAp implementation less important and less likely. In any case, 
great care has been taken to establish well-matched treatment and control groups to 
minimise selection bias associated with any endogeneity. Table 2 suggests there was no 
significant difference in baseline levels of GHE-S as a proportion of GDP (there was also no 
difference in baseline GHE-S/capita) and investigation of pre-SWAp GHE-S trends indicates 
the treatment and control groups were well matched.  
 
3.4 Investigating robustness 
We estimate variations of Equation (1) without SWAp and SWAp interaction variables. This 
provides a revised estimate of the extent to which DAHG displaces GHE-S, using updated 
data on DAHG and DAHNG and an expanded dataset (with an extra two years of 
observations, compared to the most recent published estimates) (Dieleman et al., 2013, 
Dieleman & Hanlon, 2014). To the extent that these estimates are broadly consistent with 
results from the existing literature, this analysis may provide something of a test of the 
external validity of our main specification. 
 
To address concerns regarding measurement error and the inclusion of off-budget aid in 
DAHG data and / or omission of some off-budget aid from our measure of DAHNG, we re-
estimate equation (1) after replacing our dependent variable GHE-S with GHE-A as per 
Dieleman, Graves et al. (2013). For this specification, the interpretation of £1, £2, į2 and į3 
is slightly different. Whereas full additionality (zero crowding out) would imply £1=0 when we 
regress DAHG on GHE-S, we would expect £1=1 for regressions on GHE-A, because 
increases in DAHG will be added dollar-for-dollar to GHE-A in the absence of crowding out 
(if all DAHG is on budget).  Because DAHNG is not reflected in government health 
expenditure, we would expect £2=0 for regressions on both GHE-S and GHE-A in the event 
of full additionality. While this change in dependent variable prevents the propagation of any 
measurement error in DAHG data to the left-hand side of the equation that occurs when 
DAHG is subtracted from GHE-A to obtain GHE-S (Dieleman et al., 2013), it does not 
address measurement errors in DAHG and DAHNG on the right-hand side (RHS) of the 
equation. The extent of measurement error in DAHG and DAHNG remains contested in the 
literature (Dieleman et al., 2013, Van de Sijpe, 2013a, b) and alternative (error-free) 
measures are not currently available. In such circumstances, errors-in-variables (EIV) 
models offer a means of correcting for bias due to measurement error in RHS variables. We 
use (a) the xtewreg command in STATA to implement two-step GMM estimation of the EIV 
model using higher-order moments or cumulants of rHVLGXDOVWRµFRUUHFW¶IRUHUURUVLQRQHRU
more of the RHS variables (Erickson et al., forthcoming; Erickson & Whited, 2002; Erickson 
& Whited, 2012)3, and (b) the eivreg command, in which we test sensitivity of results to a 
range of assumed, predetermined OHYHOVRI³UHOLDELOLW\´RIPLVPHDVXUHGYDULDEOHV)XOOUHVXOWV
are reported in Supplementary Materials (Tables B6-B8). 
 
Equation (1) goes some way in controlling for potential persistence in the dependent variable 
by including other persistent variables like GDP/capita and GGE as well as including 
country-specific fixed effects (capturing fixed country characteristics such as climate that 
predispose to infectious disease epidemics, for example). That said, recent studies of 
displacement effects of DAHG have included a lagged GHE-S control variable in estimations 
to control for persistence in GHE-S trends using a System Generalised Method of Moments 
(SysGMM) approach to control for endogeneity introduced as a consequence of adopting 
this dynamic specification (Dieleman et al., 2013; Dieleman & Hanlon, 2014). For additional 
robustness, we estimate dynamic panel models with a lagged GHE-S control using the 
system GMM approach. Full results are presented in Supplementary Materials.  
 
SWAps have been operationalised differently across settings. As such there remains some 
uncertainty regarding commencement and classification of some SWAps. The importance of 
this uncertainty was tested by re-estimation with systematic plausible variation in each 
SWAp couQWU\¶Vassigned year of commencement and exclusion of each SWAp country to 
assess whether results may be driven by potential misclassification of any one SWAp.  
 
 
3.5 Investigating heterogeneous SWAp effects  
Sweeney et al., (2014a) found that SWAp impacted on funding flows (including DAH levels) 
differently in the poorest implementing countries and that the SWAp impact on various health 
and health financing indicators appears to increase as SWAps mature. We follow similar 
approaches here and investigate (a) if the displacement effect of SWAp in the poorest 
implementing countries with baseline GDP per capita of one dollar per day or less differs 
from the broader group of SWAp implementing countries; and (b) if any observed SWAp 
effect on GHE-S increases in magnitude as country SWAps have time to mature.  
Further, much as there exists potential for a given SWAp to become increasingly effective as 
that particular partnership matures and lessons are learned, there may very well be lessons 
related to curbing DAH displacement of GHE-S within the SWAp framework. To investigate 
ZKHWKHUWKHUHLVHYLGHQFHWRVXSSRUWWKLVLGHDWKDW³GLVSODFHPHQWPDQDJHPHQWZLWKLQ6:$S´
may have evolved since the early days of SWAp implementation, Equation (1) is re-
estimated with the SW$SJURXSEURNHQLQWRVXEJURXSVRI³HDUO\´LPSOHPHQWHUVFRXQWULHV
LPSOHPHQWLQJSULRUWRDQG³ODWH´LPSOHPHQWHUV7KH\HDUZDVVHOHFWHGWR
separate early from late implementers as it represents an obvious break in the data as well 
as the timing of the First High Level International Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Rome ± an 
RSSRUWXQLW\IRU³HDUO\´LPSOHPHQWHUVWRVKDUHWKHLUH[SHULHQFHVZLWK6:$S%RWK³HDUO\´DQG
³ODWH´6:$SHIIHFWVZHUHPRGHOOHGXVLQJWKHIXOOVHWRIFRQWUROFRXQWULHV 
Finally, the corrupt use of displaced funds has been reported as a significant donor concern 
in this literature (Kolstad 2005; Leiderer, 2012). We explore the potential that SWAp may 
have heterogeneous effects, depending upon potential for corrupt use of funds, by again 
splitting the sample into two subgroups, now based upon baseline scores of the World 
%DQN¶Vgovernance iQGLFDWRUIRU³control of corruption´ (Kaufmann et al., 2010) where 
baseline scores were imputed using the first available observation (1996 for most countries). 
A threshold was set at the index score of -0.76 based upon the presence of an obvious 
break in the data, quite clearly splitting the control country group in two. Baseline scores less 
than -0.76 would represent relatively poorer control of corruption. An alternative threshold 
was applied in supplementary analyses to assess the sensitivity of results to this decision 
(see Supplementary Materials, Table D2).    
 
4. Results 
Table 2 reports baseline characteristics of the two groups. The groups appear well matched, 
though the control group had significantly higher non-health general government expenditure 
(GGE/GDP). The presence of such potential differences makes it important to ensure they 
are controlled for in the main model.         
 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]                                                                            
 
To first test the common trends assumption (discussed in Section 3.3), we analysed an 
alternative dataset over the period 1990 to 1996 (WHO GHE-S data is not available for this 
period), to examine if there was any evidence to suggest there were pre-existing differences 
in GHE-S trends between the treatment (SWAp countries) and control groups prior to any 
included SWAp implementation. Using public health expenditure data from the International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI, 2015), we estimated equation (1) after replacing 
SWAp variables with (i) the interaction between SWAp and a linear time trend to distinguish 
the time trend in SWAp countries from the time trend in non-SWAp countries (modelled as 
year dummies), and (ii) a dummy variable to simulate introduction of a fake SWAp to all 
SWAp group countries in 1993. Both tests attempt to identify any pre-existing differences in 
GHE-S trends between the two groups, which would undermine the common trends 
assumption underpinning the estimation approach and would raise an issue of selection 
bias. Neither test detected a significant difference between the SWAp and non-SWAp 
countries, providing support for the common trends assumption (see section C of 
Supplementary Materials for full results). 
Turning now to the main model (column 1, Table 3), we found that a one dollar increase in 
DAHG was associated with a decrease in GHE-S by about $0.78; consistent with a 
significant displacement effect. DAHNG had no significant impact on GHE-S; consistent with 
full additionality. Of primary interest though is that the delivery of an additional one dollar of 
DAHG (beyond average levels) to a SWAP implementing country rather than a non-
implementing country was associated with an increase in GHE-S of about $0.52. This 
suggests increasing DAHG (beyond average levels of DAHG) by one dollar to a SWAp 
setting displaces GHE-S by about $0.26 (obtained by summing main and interaction effects: 
-$0.78 + $0.52c = -$0.26). Further, implementing a SWAp was itself associated with a 
statistically significant increase in GHE-S, though the magnitude of effect was very small. 
Unsurprisingly, increases in general government (non-health) expenditure were also 
associated with significant increases in GHE-S, suggesting the health sector is included in 
general fiscal expansions. Interestingly, an increase in control of corruption was also 
associated with an increase in GHE-S. Both GHE-S and control of corruption may represent 
some indirect measure of government fiduciary responsibility, and this positive relationship 
may be intuitively plausible.  
 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
The main effect was robust to a suite of additional sensitivity tests presented more fully in 
Supplementary Materials (section B). Firstly, the significant protective effect of SWAp on 
DAHG displacement of GHE-S remained present when estimated in a dynamic panel 
structure using a system GMM approach, though the magnitude of the effect was smaller. 
Second, results from the EIV models (see Supplementary Materials, tables B6-B8 and 
accompanying text) confirm that headline results from our main model remain plausible 
under a range of assumptions regarding measurement error, but that further work is required 
before drawing strong conclusions.  Other analyses included re-estimation using alternative 
sample selection criteria, plausible variation in SWAp commencement times and systematic 
exclusion of individual SWAps (thereby excluding chance that results were driven by an 
individual misclassified SWAp country). The SWAp protective effect remained robust to 
these analyses.  
  
:KHQWKHVDPSOHZDVUHVWULFWHGWRWKHVXEJURXSRI³SRRUHVW´FRXQWULHVZLWKEDVHOLQH
GDP/capita of no more than $1/day), the protective effect of SWAp remained largely 
unchanged (see column 1, Table 4). However, it appears there is a slightly larger non-SWAp 
displacement effect of DAHG on GHE-S in this subsample, perhaps increasing the relative 
importance of SWAp as a strategy for reducing the effects of displacement. These results 
were robust to the inclusion of additional variables and alternative sample selection criteria 
(see Table D1 in Supplementary Materials). It is also worth noting that GDP/capita has a 
significant and negative association with GHE-S in this subgroup of countries. Further 
research may indicate whether this might be related to GHE-S declining in response to 
increased out-of-pocket expenditure on health.  
[PLEASE INSERT TABEL 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In other investigations of heterogeneity presented in Table 4, it does not appear as though 
the displacement effect of SWAp on DAH allocated to government has changed significantly 
between the early period of SWAp implementation and the later period. However, 
channelling DAH via non-government actors now results in a significant fly-paper effect 
when a SWAp is in place (columns 2 & 3, Table 4). It also appears that the effect of SWAp 
on DAH displacement may vary, depending upon control of corruption. Specifically, the 
protective effect of SWAp on the displacement of GHE-S when DAH is channelled to 
government appears higher in the subgroup of countries with relatively better control of 
corruption at baseline (columns 4 & 5, table 4). Interestingly, in the subgroup of countries 
with poorer control of corruption at baseline, there is evidence to suggest channelling DAH 
via non-government actors may also reduce the extent of displacement of GHE-S when 
those funds are allocated to a SWAp setting (column 4, Table 4). More research is required 
to tease out and better understand these preliminary findings.  
 
Table 5 presents the estimation results for the evolving SWAp effect. Whilst the direction of 
SWAp on displacement was difficult to predict a priori, there was an expectation that as 
SWAps mature, the magnitude of influence might increase. This prior is confirmed by the 
results in Table 5. As a SWAp matures beyond 3 years, its protective effect on GHE-S 
increases ± eventually peaking in the most mature SWAps where a $1 increase in DAHG to 
a SWAp country increases GHE-S by $0.64 (for a net displacement effect of $0.17 as 
compared to displacement of $0.81 per $1 in non-SWAp settings). The presence of a 
significant difference in the pre-SWAp period is of interest. One cannot entirely exclude the 
possibility that this indicates there may have been some pre-existing difference in GHE-S 
trends between the SWAp and control group, though earlier analyses of the common trends 
assumption did not hint at such a difference. Alternatively, this could reflect a preparatory 
effect, in that the decision to move towards SWAp implementation may itself have resulted in 
the recipient country government taking its commitments to the health system (as indicated 
by expenditure) more seriously.  
 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
6. Discussion 
In light of the ex ante ambiguous effect of a health SWAp on the effect of health aid on 
government health expenditure, we have empirically assessed what the net effect might be. 
While theoretically it seemed plausible that the increased control over how health aid can be 
allocated ± afforded by SWAp ± might increase the extent of displacement, our results reject 
this prediction. By contrast, increasing health aid where a SWAp is in place appears to 
reduce the magnitude of any displacement. The main model predicted that allocating an 
additional dollar of health aid to a country where a SWAp is in place may reduce the 
magnitude of displacement from about $0.78 (where there is no SWAp) to about $0.26. Or to 
put it another way, $0.52 more cents of domestic government revenues is spent in the health 
sector when health aid is channelled to settings where there is a SWAp in place. So whilst a 
SWAp cannot facilitate the end of health aid fungibility, it does appear to reduce it 
significantly. Moreover, implementing a SWAp was itself associated with a statistically 
significant increase in GHE-S, though the magnitude of effect was very small. Whilst there is 
some dispute in the literature as to the extent to which the available DAH data captures off-
budget aid, even if displacement is overestimated as argued by Van De Sijpe, (2011a, b), 
the analysis still suggests SWAp is beneficial for increasing health spending. 
 
This analysis also provides an updated estimate of the displacement effect of DAHG on 
GHE-S over an extended period of analysis and using updated DAHG data from the IHME. 
Reassuringly, the displacement estimates of DAHG on GHE-S are very consistent with those 
by Dieleman et al. (2013), despite using an alternative estimation approach as well as a 
different specification. This provides some confidence as to the external validity of our 
model.  
 
Previous theoretical and empirical works have suggested that contracts or agreements might 
be used to produce a flypaper effect, where government funds stick to aid dollars. This 
appears to be one possible explanation for the protective effect of SWAp in reducing the 
extent of displacement. For example, the Kyrgyz government was expected to increase state 
expenditure by 0.6% annually as a condition of continued donor participation in the 
Kyrgysztan SWAp (Ulikpan et al., 2014).  
 
A focus of SWAp evaluations understandably lay in examining changes in relationship 
dynamics between a government (usually health ministry) and donors, rather than the health 
ministry with other government ministries. Nonetheless, case-studies provide a good deal of 
indirect evidence that increased capacity of health sector officials to negotiate and retain 
budgetary share under SWAp may have contributed to the observed finding. For example, 
case-study evidence suggests that recipient government health sector leadership has 
become increasingly influential over SWAp policy setting and funding decisions as the 
evaluated SWAps have matured (Foster et. al., 2000; Jefferys & Walford, 2003 ; 
Vaillancourt, 2009; Walford, 2007). Specifically, Vaillancourt (2009) evaluated health SWAps 
in Bangladesh, Ghana, Kyrgyz Republic, Malawi, Nepal, Tanzania and concluded that all but 
Malawi had made substantial progress on establishing country-led partnerships and 
increasing health sector leadership. Such conclusions are consistent with the findings of this 
paper that the extent to which SWAps reduce displacement, appears to increase as SWAps 
mature ± capacity building takes time.  Peterset al. (2013) however, concluded that the 
extent to which SWAps have increased health sector leadership has been mixed.  
 
Case-studies also provide limited direct evidence for an increased capacity of health sector 
officials to negotiate and retain budgetary share under SWAp. Walford (2007) describes how 
SWAPs have been used to help facilitate better links between the Ministries of Health and 
)LQDQFHDQGKHOS0LQLVWULHVRI+HDOWKGHYHORSWKHLUFDVHIRUIXQGLQJ:KHQ=DPELD¶VPDMRU
donors reportedly shifted aid delivery from DAH to general budget support (untied to any 
VHFWRUDVD³UHZDUG´IRUVWURQJ6:$SDQG'$+PDQDJHPHQWWKHUHZDVFRQFHUQWKDW
overall health sector funding would fall (Sundewall et al., 2010; Walford, 2007). However, 
ZLWKWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶V'),'support, the Ministry of Health negotiated with the Ministry 
of Finance to secure a larger budget to replace the reductiRQLQ'),'¶V'$+Sundewall et 
al., 2010; Walford, 2007). It should be kept in mind that the majority of evidence of health 
SWAp impacts is drawn from case studies where the lack of a counterfactual makes it 
difficult to control for potentially important confounding effects. 
 
In an important contribution to the discussion on aid fungibility, McGillivray and Morrissey 
(2000) raised the very fundamental question of whether fungibility even mattered. They 
suggested that what was ultimately more important was maximising welfare gains from 
government and aid expenditure taken together and it may be less important to worry about 
which funds were allocated where. Whilst we are sympathetic to this view, not all donors 
attach equal weight to welfare gains in health and non-health sectors. Moreover, allocation 
of displaced funds to other sectors may be driven by political considerations rather than by 
efforts to maximise an overarching social welfare function (Hauck & Smith, 2015).  
 
From the perspectives of various stakeholders, there is a lot to suggest that displacement 
GRHVLQGHHGµPDWWHU¶FRQVLGHUDEO\&HUWDLQO\ELODWHUDOGRQRUVKDYHSUHYLRXVO\QRted the 
perceived corrupt use of displaced DAH (Leiderer 2012, Kolstad 2005). Whilst displacement 
does not imply corrupt use (funds may be put to an alternative, potentially welfare increasing 
use) (Morrissey 2015), the WHO and other development agencies remain concerned where 
displacement occurs in poorer aid recipient countries, many of whom are unable to provide 
even a basic set of health services for their populations (WHO 2010). For the same reason, 
displacement (or at least government expenditure on health) appears to matter greatly to the 
UHFLSLHQWQDWLRQ¶Vpeople, many of whom face significant financial hardship, financing health 
care out of pocket (WHO, 2010). Further, whilst we cannot know if spending that marginal 
DAHG dollar (effectively a marginal public revenue dollar) on health is welfare maximising, 
there is at least evidence to suggest that a marginal DAH dollar can be welfare increasing, 
yielding improvements in population health as measured by for example: immunisation rates 
(Dietrich, 2011; Feeny & Ouattara, 2013), disease-prevalence (Yogo & Mallaye, 2015), and 
infant or child mortality (Kizhakethalackal et al., 2013; Mishra & Newhouse, 2009; Mukherjee 
& Kizhakethalackal 2013, Yogo & Mallaye 2015).  
 
Additional findings from this analysis suggest that displacement of government expenditure 
may be greater in poorest countries; perhaps increasing the value of supporting SWAps in 
such settings; and that the presence of a SWAp may reduce the extent of GHE-S 
displacement of (a) a marginal dollar of DAH to government when allocated to a setting with 
relatively stronger (baseline) control of corruption and (b) a marginal dollar of DAH 
channelled via non-government actors when allocated to a setting with relatively weaker 
(baseline) control of corruption. Further investigations are required to better understand this 
relationship, but these results support the interpretation that the size of the moderating effect 
of SWAp on health aid displacement could well differ across settings. Hence, donors may 
need to consider this in deciding the nature of their engagement with SWAp in different 
contexts.  
 We believe our findings are particularly timely now, at a moment that sees health SWAps at 
something of a crossroads and seemingly, donor enthusiasm for the Paris Principles, waning 
(Peters et al., 2013; Shorten et al., 2012). Donor decisions to refocus on delivering project±
based aid with the hope that maintaining control over DAH allocations will (a) reduce 
recipient opportunity to displace funds (as some might perceive would be present under a 
SWAp); and (b) enable identification of funding opportunities that limit displacement of GHE-
S or even create a flypaper effect, and may seem like an appropriate policy response. 
However, our findings suggest the opposite may be the case. Empirically, it appears that re-
engaging with the principles for effective aid delivery via a SWAp (or a SWAp-like 
mechanism), may be a means to help donors reduce the extent to which their health aid 
contributions are treated as a replacement for domestic government health expenditure 
commitments.  
 
In interpreting our findings, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of the work. Van de 
Sijpe (2013a, b) demonstrated convincingly the potential for upward bias in estimates of the 
fungibility of health aid due to inclusion of off-budget aid in DAHG data. While the extent of 
measurement error in DAHG and DAHNG data is contested in the literature (Dieleman et al., 
2013; Van de Sijpe, 2013a, b), tracking DAH flows is a difficult task and there remains a risk 
that existing measures of DAHG include non-negligible levels of off-budget aid. Moreover, 
where SWAp improves traceability of DAHG or brings previously off-budget aid on to 
recipient government budgets, there is potential for a between-group difference in 
measurement error to arise; resulting in upward bias in estimates of the moderating effect of 
SWAp on crowding out. While bringing a larger share of aid on budget would be a desirable 
and important effect of SWAp, this is not the mechanism via which SWAp is hypothesised to 
influence GHE-S in the present study.  
 
As such, we have made significant efforts to distinguish between the moderating effect of 
SWAp on crowding out and reductions in the extent of measurement error under SWAp. 
Specifically, we have conducted robustness tests using errors-in-variables (EIV) models to 
correct for bias due to measurement error in DAHG, DAHNG, DAHG*SWAp and 
DAHNG*SWAp. While our headline results from standard FE and system GMM models 
remain plausible under a range of assumptions regarding measurement error, such 
corrections constitute second-best solutions. Our findings should be treated as provisional 
until replicated using data for which FRQVHQVXVKDVEHHQUHDFKHGWKDW³DQDFFXUDWHDQG
transparent delineation of on- and off-EXGJHWDLG´Van de Sijpe, 2013b) has been achieved. 
That said, information provided by Dieleman et al., (2013) describing the IHME approach to 
tracking on- and off-budget aid, indicates improvements have been made in the reliability of 
data to that used in the earlier papers, which motivated the important concerns raised by 
Van de Sijpe (2013a).  
 
With regards to general limitations of the approach employed in the present study, Ooms et 
al. (2010) previously argued that understanding why health aid displaces government health 
expenditure is as important as knowing the average size of displacement. This study could 
be equally criticised as we only estimate average effects, missing out on any nuance of 
effect as SWAps operationalised differently will likely have achieved different effects. Whilst 
we explore some heterogeneity and context effects in our extensive range of robustness 
tests, further research is required to tease out lessons about which core SWAp elements are 
most important to realise its protective effects. Currently such detailed data on SWAp 
implementation by country does not exist. In related work, we are currently exploring 
different quantitative approaches to estimate individual country impacts of SWAp (eg. 
employing difference-in-differences analyses for individual SWAp implementers; and the 
panel data approach to policy evaluation set out in Hsiao, Ching & Wan (2012)). It may be 
SRVVLEOHWRLGHQWLI\SDUWLFXODUO\³VWURQJ´6:$SVXVLQJWKLVDSSURDFKPRWLYDWLQJXVHRIFDVe 
VWXG\PHWKRGVWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHOLNHO\IDFWRUVWKDWKDYHOHGWR³VWURQJ´SHUIRUPDQFH 
 Significant steps were taken to remove sources of selection bias and we believe the SWAp 
implementing and control groups are well matched. However, it is possible that some 
selection bias persists. As such there remains a risk that between group differences in 
additional unobserved factors may be influencing the extent of change in GHE-S attributed 
to SWAp. Baseline comparisons and tests of common trends in GHE-S prior to the period of 
implementation provide some comfort that the groups were well matched; yet data limitations 
over the period prior to significant SWAp uptake (1990 to 1996) do introduce some 
uncertainty.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Health aid remains a vital source of funds for a significant sub-group of recipient countries 
(Lu et al., 2010; WHO, 2010). The countries included in our analysis includes the poorest of 
the poor, with health sectors nowhere near sourcing sufficient domestic funds for a minimum 
package of essential services. For these countries, high levels of fungibility undermine 
efforts to bridge the funding gap. This analysis provides support that allocating health aid to 
governments where a SWAp is in place may help by reducing the extent of displaced 
government health expenditure. This may be as a result of contracts within SWAp securing 
recipient government contributions. It may also be as a result of strengthening health sector 
governance, increasing capacity to secure government funds for the sector. Irrespective of 
the specific mechanism, this potential benefit of SWAp should be given weight by donors 
and health ministries considering ± or already in the process of ± managing their health aid 
programmes within a health SWAp.  
 
Endnotes: 
1
 0RUULVVH\QRWHVWKDWVRPHGRQRUVKROGD³VNHSWLFDOYLHZ´RIJHQHUDOEXGJHWVXSSRUW*%6SULPDULO\GXHWRFRQFHUQV
that GBS may carry a heightened risk of corruption. However, Morrissey (2015) argues that corruption under GBS should be 
less of a concern given more recent studies show improved, more transparent recipient financial management systems and 
that GBS further supports such improvements (p.103). 
2 Interpretation of £1, £2, ¥2 and ¥3 as described above is predicated on valid and reliable measurement of DAHG and 
DAHNG. A number of difficulties in tracking DAH flows and attributing these flows to government or non-government channels 
have previously been identified in the literature (Van de Sijpe (2013a, b). The potential for such difficulties to bias estimates of 
model parameters is noted and discussed in Section 3.2 and 3.4 of the main manuscript and in Supplementary Materials.  
3
 Erickson & Whited (2012) run Monte Carlo experiments to evaluate the finite sample properties of this and other approaches 
to addressing measurement error. Importantly, the use of higher-order moments/cumulants in two-step GMM is robust to serial 
correlation in the measurement errors. In contrast, using lags of mismeasured regressors as instruments in IV or dynamic panel 
PRGHOV³FDQSURGXFHWKHVDPHELDVHGUHVXOWVDVGRHV2/6LIWKHPHDVXUHPHQWHUURULVVHULDOO\FRUUHODWHG´(ULFNVRQ	:KLWHG
2012 p1287). Previous attempts to address measurement error in aid fungibility models using lags in dynamic panel models 
(Dieleman et al., 2013) were criticised by Van de Sijpe (2013b) for their potential sensitivity to serial correlation in measurement 
errors. 
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 Table 1. Countries included in main sample (with year of SWAp commencement) 
SWAp implementing countries (n=27) Non-implementing control countries (n=25) 
Bangladesh (1997) 
Benin (2010) 
Burkina Faso (2001) 
Burundi (2008) 
Cambodia (2000) 
Ethiopia (1997) 
Ghana (1997) 
Kyrgyzstan (2005) 
Lesotho (2005) 
Madagascar (2007) 
Malawi (2004) 
Mali (1998) 
Mauritania (2010) 
Mongolia (2009) 
Mozambique (1997) 
Nepal (2004) 
Nicaragua (2005) 
Niger (2006) 
Papua New Guinea (2008) 
Rwanda (2007) 
Senegal (1997) 
Solomon Is. (2009) 
Sudan (2006) 
Tanzania (1997) 
Uganda (2000) 
Uzbekistan (2009) 
Vietnam (2009) 
Angola 
Armenia 
Cape Verde 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo 
Congo, DRC 
Eritrea 
Fiji 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Indonesia 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Laos 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Philippines 
Sierra Leone 
Sri Lanka 
The Gambia 
Togo 
 
 
Table 2. Comparison of baseline (1995) characteristics.  
  SWAp Countries Control Countries 
T-test     
p-value Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
GDP/capita ($) 27 411.71 301.49 134.40 1445.66 25 590.96 502.36 134.33 2540.46 0.13 
Population (millions) 27 18.89 25.95 0.36 119.87 25 26.26 48.47 0.08 194.11 0.50 
GHES/GDP (%) 27 1.33 1.42 -2.71 3.69 25 1.17 2.85 -8.04 8.68 0.81 
DAHG/GDP (%) 27 0.83 0.95 0.00 3.74 25 1.21 2.40 0.00 10.82 0.46 
DAHNG/GDP (%) 27 0.29 0.30 0.00 1.21 25 0.19 0.21 0.00 0.79 0.19 
GGE/GDP (%) 27 20.47 8.51 5.51 52.25 25 28.40 18.81 6.62 77.21 0.06 
IMR (per 1,000 live births) 27 84.39 29.57 29.10 143.40 25 80.90 37.66 17.20 153.40 0.71 
Life expectancy 27 54.99 8.68 31.24 72.14 25 56.06 9.43 35.82 69.42 0.67 
HIV deaths (per 100,000) 27 76.12 119.66 0.00 424.50 25 62.10 106.41 0.00 456.00 0.66 
 
  
Table 3. Impact of SWAp on aid displacement  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 GHE-S GHE-S GHE-S GHE-S GHE-S 
DAHGit -0.779*** -0.779*** -0.777*** -0.762*** -0.762*** 
 (0.061) (0.060) (0.074) (0.080) (0.116) 
SWApit 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SWAp*DAHGit 0.518*** 0.519*** 0.514*** 0.441*** 0.440*** 
 (0.123) (0.122) (0.124) (0.124) (0.127) 
DAHNG 0.124 0.124 0.098 0.098 0.075 
 (0.103) (0.103) (0.118) (0.096) (0.111) 
SWAP*DAHNG -0.084 -0.086 -0.063 -0.063 -0.050 
 (0.198) (0.203) (0.202) (0.192) (0.200) 
Log (GDP/capita) it -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
GGEit 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.025** 0.025** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) 
Log (HIV deaths)ita 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log (IMR)it  -0.000   -0.001 
  (0.005)   (0.005) 
Debt relief it   0.002  0.001 
   (0.004)  (0.003) 
Government effectiveness it    0.000 0.000 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
Corruption Control it    0.004** 0.004* 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
N 
SWAp countries 
Control countries 
936 
27 
25 
936 
27 
25 
918 
27 
24 
878 
27 
25 
863 
27 
24 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; year trends included, results suppressed for brevity. 
a The main model (column 1) was also robust to re-estimation using HIV prevalence data from the IHME and World Bank  ? 
see Table B9, Supplementary Materials. Both of these datasets contain missing data, thus HIV deaths has been used in the 
main model.  
 
 
  
Table 4. Heterogeneous effects of SWAp on DAH displacement of GHE 
 (1) 
Poorest 
subgroupa 
 
(2) 
Early 
implementersb 
(3) 
Late 
implementersb 
(4) 
Poorer control 
of corruptionc 
 
(5) 
Stronger control 
of corruptionc 
 
 GHE-S GHE-S GHE-S GHE-S GHE-S 
DAHGit -0.860*** -0.856*** -0.781*** -0.798*** -0.762*** 
 (0.063) (0.036) (0.063) (0.064) (0.105) 
SWApit 0.006*** 0.002 0.006*** 0.005** 0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
SWAp*DAHGit 0.543*** 0.346** 0.399*** 0.253 0.544*** 
 (0.093) (0.150) (0.146) (0.210) (0.140) 
DAHNG 0.127 0.037 0.155 0.135 0.141 
 (0.155) (0.117) (0.107) (0.205) (0.086) 
SWAP*DAHNG -0.143 -0.139 0.296* 0.408* -0.308 
 (0.232) (0.221) (0.153) (0.213) (0.215) 
Log (GDP/capita) it -0.007** -0.004* -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
GGEit 0.028** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.032* 0.024*** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.006) 
Log (HIV deaths)it  -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
N 
SWAp countries 
Control countries 
504 
17 
11 
648 
11 
25 
738 
16 
25 
476 
17 
11 
476 
17 
11 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; year trends included, results suppressed for brevity. 
a Baseline GDP/capita of no more than $1/day. 
b Early SWAp implementation  was defined as prior to 2003.  
c Baseline control of corruption threshold set at -0.76 on the WGI control of corruption index, which ranges from about -2.5 
to 2.5 (Kaufmann, Kraay et al. 2010). Note, the baseline observation for this indicator was actually 1996 (except for 
Solomon Islands, Cape Verde and Kiribati for whom it was 1998.  A baseline score lower than this -0.76 threshold means 
that relatively poorer control of corruption is present in that country. This threshold was based upon the presence of an 
observed, obvious break in the data. An alternative threshold is applied in Supplementary Materials to assess the 
sensitivity of results to this decision (See Supplementary Materials, table D2). 
 
 
  
Table 5. Evolving SWAp effects on displacement 
 (1) (2) 
 GHE-S GHE-S 
DAHGit -0.810*** -0.833*** 
 (0.055) (0.108) 
DAHNGit 0.101 0.059 
 (0.098) (0.107) 
1-3 yrs pre_swap 0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
(Preswap)*dahg 0.350*** 0.286* 
 (0.110) (0.153) 
(Preswap)*dahng 0.000 0.000 
 (.) (.) 
SWAp yrs 1-3 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
(SWAp yrs 1-3)*dahg 0.433*** 0.359* 
 (0.157) (0.210) 
(SWAp yrs 1-3)*dahng 0.335** 0.375** 
 (0.140) (0.172) 
SWAp yrs 4+ 0.008*** 0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
(SWAp yrs 4+)*dahg 0.637*** 0.585*** 
 (0.172) (0.146) 
(SWAp yrs 4+)*dahng -0.211 -0.188 
 (0.242) (0.242) 
Log (GDP/capita)it -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
GGEit 0.028*** 0.024** 
 (0.010) (0.012) 
Log (HIV deaths)it 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Log (IMR)it  0.001 
  (0.005) 
Debt relief it  0.001 
  (0.003) 
Government effectivenessit  -0.000 
  (0.002) 
Corruption controlit  0.004** 
  (0.002) 
   
N 
SWAp countries 
Control countries 
936 
27 
25 
863 
27 
24 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; 
year trends included, results suppressed for brevity. 
 
 
  
Figure 1: Crowding out of government health expenditure 
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The impact of SWAps on aid displacement of domestic health expenditure - 
Appendix 
Table 1. Sources of data 
Variable Description Source 
GHE-S Government health expenditure as the 
source ± IXQGVGUDZQIURPJRYHUQPHQW¶V
own revenues (ie. Excluding DAH). 
Constructed using WHO 
and IHME data 
GHE-A Government health expenditure as the agent 
± includes GHE-S and DAH channelled 
through government. 
WHO  
DAHG Development assistance for health 
channelled to recipient government. 
IHME 
DAHNG Development assistance for health 
channelled to non-government recipients in 
given country. 
IHME 
SWAp Dummy variable indicating presence of 
SWAp. 
Search of grey and peer 
reviewed literature. See 
web appendix for Sweeney, 
Mortimer et al. (2014) 
GDP/capita Gross domestic product per capita. World Bank 
GDP Gross domestic product. World Bank 
GGE *HQHUDOJRYHUQPHQW¶Vnon-health 
expenditure.  
Constructed using WHO 
data 
HIV  HIV deaths per 100,000. IHME 
IMR Infant mortality rate (deaths per 1,000 live 
births) 
World Bank 
Debt relief Debt forgiveness or reduction.  World Bank 
Government 
effectiveness 
Index of perceived government 
effectiveness. Scores range between -2.5 
(poorest) and 2.5 (best). 
World Bank (see 
Kaufmann, Kraay et al. 
(2010)) 
Control of 
corruption 
Index of perceived control corruption. Scores 
range between -2.5 (poorest) and 2.5 (best). 
World Bank (see 
Kaufmann, Kraay et al. 
(2010)) 
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Supplementary Materials:  
The impact of SWAps on aid displacement of domestic health expenditure 
A. Estimating propensity to SWap 
Table A1. Linear probability model results for estimating propensity to ever implement 
a SWAp after 1996 given 1995 baseline observed characteristics.  
 (1) 
SWAp  
Log (GDP/capita)i -0.319** 
 (0.126) 
Log (GHE-A)i 0.090 
 (0.089) 
Log (population)i -0.064 
 (0.082) 
Log (DAHG)i -0.014 
 (0.011) 
DAHNGi -0.052 
 (0.067) 
No. of donorsi 0.035* 
 (0.019) 
Log (IMR)i -0.010 
 (0.146) 
Life expectancyi 0.012 
 (0.012) 
HIV deathsi 0.000 
 (0.001) 
Africa  ? North of Saharai -0.684** 
 (0.319) 
Sub-Saharan Africai -0.303 
 (0.221) 
Europei -0.674** 
 (0.278) 
Far East Asiai -0.444* 
 (0.265) 
Middle Easti -0.713** 
 (0.303) 
North & Central Americai -0.540** 
 (0.235) 
Oceaniai -a 
 - 
South & Central Asiai -0.378 
 (0.261) 
South Americai -0.575** 
 (0.242) 
  
Countries 99 
a
 
Oceania was the reference region. A significant negative coefficient for a Region suggests, 
KROGLQJRWKHUIDFWRUVFRQVWDQWDQ³DYHUDJH´FRXQWU\LQWKDW5HJLRQZHUHOHVVOLNHO\WR
LPSOHPHQWD6:$SWKDQKDGWKDW³DYHUDJH´FRXQWU\EHHQJHRJUDSKLFDOO\ORFDWHG in Oceania.  
B. ROBUSTNESS OF MAIN SPECIFICATION  
Table B1. Models of health displacement without the moderating effects of SWApa. 
 (1) 
Fixed Effects 
(6) 
Sys GMMb 
 GHE-S GHE-S 
GHE-Sit-1 - 0.156** 
  (0.073) 
DAHGit -0.604*** -0.753*** 
 (0.109) (0.102) 
DAHNGit 0.149 0.310*** 
 (0.111) (0.120) 
GGEit 0.032*** 0.055*** 
 (0.010) (0.017) 
Log (GDP/capita)it -0.003 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Log (HIV deaths)it -0.005 -0.000 
 (0.007) (0.001) 
   
Observations 936 884 
Countries 52 52 
R2 0.378 - 
Instruments - 51 
Hansen p-value - 0.204 
AR(2) p-value - 0.283 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; year trends included, results suppressed for brevity. 
a  These models are comparable to existing literature and provide a comparative assessment of the external validity of the 
main specification.  The estimates of DAHG displacement are smaller in magnitude but qualitatively consistent with 
Dieleman, Graves et al. (2013) estimates of displacement using fixed effects (-0.790) and System GMM (-0.856) estimation 
methods.  
b Model used two-step estimation, and treats lagged GHE-S, DAHG and DAHNG as endogenous. The instrument set is 
collapsed and principal components analysis is employed to reduce the potential of instrument proliferation delivering a 
spurious Hansen test score.  
 
 
Sample Selection 
As can be seen in Table B2 below (which presents baseline characteristics of all health aid 
recipient countries meeting our data restrictions - described in table footnote), SWAps have 
been implemented in those countries who in 1995, were on average poorer and less healthy 
than the average non-implementing health aid recipient country. These differences 
motivated the sample selection approach set out in the manuscript. A comparison of 
baseline characteristics of the more inclusive sample described in Table B2 and the main 
sample (Table 2 of main text) shows this approach has identified a more closely matched set 
of countries (on observed factors at baseline). Further, Figure B1 compares the overlapping 
GLVWULEXWLRQRIFRXQWULHV¶SURSHQsity to SWAp scores (estimated via the linear probability 
model (LPM) set out in the main text) before (full sample of countries with sufficient data for 
inclusion in the LPM) and after sample selection on propensity scores. The footnote in Table 
B2 lists the inclusion criteria for the full sample. Table B3 provides the full list of countries 
included in the descriptive Table B2.   
It is however important to test the sensitivity of main results to changes in sample selection 
decisions. Table B4 presents results from re-estimation of the main specification after 
applying the following list sample selection decisions (note sample number corresponds with 
column number in Table B4): 
x Sample 1 = main sample results (i.e. all countries with SWAp-propensity 
score>0.24). 
x Sample 2 = a more inclusive sample including countries with SWAp propensity 
score >0.2. 
x Sample 3 = a more exclusive sample which restricts inclusion to SWAp-propensity 
scores from 0.24 > p > 0.86 (the overlapping range of SWAp propensity scores 
across groups). 
x Sample 4 = most inclusive sample including all countries with sufficient data to 
include in the SWAp-propensity linear probability model (This sample is described in 
Table B2).  
x Sample 5 =  alternative sample selection approach based upon overlapping range of 
baseline GDP per capita - because health SWAps are most prominent in low-income 
health aid recipient countries (at baseline). Note baseline GDP per capita was 
measured as the average GDP per capita from 1990 to 1995. 
Table B2. Baseline FKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIODUJHUVDPSOHRIFRXQWULHVZLWK³FRPSOHWHGDWD´a 
  SWAp Countries Control Countries T-test     
p-
value Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
GDP/capita ($) 27 411.71 301.49 134.40 1445.66 70 1771.17 1514.83 134.33 7407.65 0.00 
Population (millions) 27 18.89 25.95 0.36 119.87 70 24.31 40.36 0.08 194.11 0.44 
GHE-S/GDP (%) 27 1.33 1.42 -2.71 3.69 70 2.13 0.02 -0.08 0.09 0.03 
DAHG/GDP (%) 27 0.83 0.95 0.00 3.74 70 0.55 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.28 
DAHNG/GDP (%) 27 0.29 0.30 0.00 1.21 70 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
GGE/GDP ($) 27 20.47 8.51 5.51 52.25 70 26.33 0.14 0.07 0.77 0.01 
IMR (per 1,000 live 
births) 27 84.39 29.57 29.10 143.40 70 52.87 35.17 8.40 153.40 0.00 
Life expectancy 27 54.99 8.68 31.24 72.14 70 63.36 9.20 35.82 76.77 0.00 
HIV deaths (per 
100,000) 27 76.12 119.66 0.00 424.50 70 33.90 74.88 0.00 456.00 0.04 
a Countries with at least 16 of a possible 18 complete annual observations (defined as GHE-S, DAHG, 
DAHNG, SWAp, GDP, and GDP/capita data present), including a 1995 (baseline). Further, countries 
required 1995 data on population, number of donors, infant mortality, life expectancy and HIV deaths 
for estimation of a SWAp-propensity score via the linear probability model. NOTE:  Zambia excluded 
as its SWAp commenced prior to first GHE-S observation. India and China were excluded given 
country-wide SWAp very unlikely. Lithuania, Latvia and Poland were included in the LPM given they 
had received DAHNG in the period of interest and thus may influence SWAp likelihood, but were 
excluded from subsequent analyses as had received zero DAHG disbursements.  
 
  
Figure B1. Comparison of SWAp-propensity score distributions by SWAp status  
  
Note: All countries with propensity score to the right of the far left vertical (dashed) line are included in 
the main sample. The more exclusive Sample 3 includes all countries that fall within the range of the 
two vertical (dashed and dotted) lines. Sample 4 ± the most inclusive sample includes all countries 
with sufficient data to generate a SWAp propensity score (i.e. all countries in Figure B1). 
 
Table B3. Countries used in selected alternative samples to test sensitivity main 
findings to sample selection decisions  
SWAp countries (n=27) a b Non-implementing countriesa(n=70) 
Bangladesh 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Ethiopia 
Ghana 
Kyrgyzstan 
Lesotho 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mongolia 
Mozambique 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Solomon Is. 
Sudan 
Tanzaniac 
Uganda 
Uzbekistan 
Vietnam 
Albaniab 
Angolab 
Argentina 
Armeniab 
Belize 
Bhutanb 
Boliviab 
Bosnia & 
   
Herzegovinab 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Cameroonb 
Cape Verdeb 
Central African 
   Republicb 
Chadb 
Chile 
Colombia 
Comorosb 
Congob 
Congo, DRCb 
Costa Rica 
Cote d'Ivoireb 
Cuba 
Dominican 
Republic 
Ecuador 
Egyptb 
El Salvador 
Eritrea 
Fiji 
Guatemalab 
Guineab 
Guinea-Bissaub 
Guyanab 
Haitib 
Hondurasb 
Indonesiab 
Iran 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenyab 
Kiribatib 
Laosb 
Lebanon 
Malaysia 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Namibia 
Nigeriab 
Pakistanb 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippinesb 
Romania 
Russia 
Sierra Leoneb 
South Africa 
Sri Lankab 
St.Vincent & 
the 
   Grenadines 
Surinameb 
Swaziland 
Thailand 
The Gambiab 
Togob 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Yemenb 
0
5
10
15
-.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
SWAp-propensity score
non-implementing countries SWAp countries
a
 &RXQWULHVPHHWLQJ³FRPSOHWHGDWD´UHTXLUHPHQWVVHWRXWLQIRRWQRWHRI7DEOH% 
b These countries are included in an alternative robustness sample (Sample 5 above), selected on the 
basis of the overlapping range (of SWAp and non-implementing countries) of baseline GDP per 
capita. Baseline GDP per capita was measured as the average GDP per capita from 1990 to 1995. 
This selection process also identified the following countries for inclusion that had insufficient data to 
be included in the linear probability model sample selection approach: SWAp countries ± Moldova 
and Samoa; Non-SWAp countries ± Azerbaijan, Djibouti, Georgia and Turkmenistan.  
c
 In an additional test of the sensitivity of main specification results to sample selection the inclusion 
SWAp-propHQVLW\VFRUHWKUHVKROGVZHUHVHWDW!S!UHVXOWLQJLQ7DQ]DQLD¶VH[FOXVLRQZLWK
a SWAp-propensity score >0.86 (Sample 3 above).  
 
Table B4. Sensitivity of findings to alternative sample selection decisions 
 
(1) 
Main Sample  
Propensity>0.2
4 
(2) 
Sample 2 
Propensity>0.2 
(3) 
Sample 3 
Propensity range: 
0.24 to 0.86 
(4) 
Sample 4 
  ?ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ ?ĚĂƚĂ
countriesa 
(4) 
Sample 5 
Baseline GDP/capita: 
$156 to $1184b 
 
GHE-S GHE-S GHE-S GHE-S GHE-S 
DAHGit -0.779*** -0.779*** -0.779*** -0.752*** -0.788*** 
 
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.065) (0.061) 
SWApit 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.002 0.004*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SWAp*DAHGit 0.518*** 0.525*** 0.530*** 0.519*** 0.520*** 
 
(0.123) (0.122) (0.125) (0.122) (0.122) 
DAHNGit 0.124 0.137 0.127 0.083 0.107 
 
(0.103) (0.102) (0.103) (0.096) (0.112) 
SWAP*DAHNGit -0.084 -0.092 -0.127 -0.084 -0.076 
 
(0.198) (0.196) (0.203) (0.193) (0.200) 
Log (GDP/capita)it -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.000 -0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
GGEit 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Log (HIV deaths)it 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
     
Observations 
SWAp countries 
Control countries 
936 
27 
25 
1044 
27 
31 
918 
26 
25 
1742 
27 
70 
1206 
29 
38 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; year trends included, results suppressed for brevity. 
a most inclusive sample including all countries with sufficient data to include in the SWAp-propensity linear probability 
model. 
b
 These countries are included in an alternative robustness sample (Sample 5 above), selected on the basis of the 
overlapping range (of SWAp and non-implementing countries) of baseline GDP per capita. Baseline GDP per capita was 
measured as the average GDP per capita from 1990 to 1995 
 
  
Table B5. Dynamic panel estimation of SWAp*DAH effect using SysGMM  
 OLS FE SYS-GMMa 
 (1) (2) (3)bc (4)d 
 GHE-S GHE-S GHE-S GHE-S 
GHE-St-1 0.652*** 0.249*** 0.218** 0.235*** 
 (0.079) (0.073) (0.087) (0.072) 
DAHGit -0.426*** -0.714*** -0.620*** -0.679*** 
 (0.133) (0.083) (0.147) (0.090) 
SWApit 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
SWAp*DAHGit 0.320*** 0.420*** 0.300** 0.659*** 
 (0.110) (0.106) (0.142) (0.179) 
DAHNGit 0.330*** 0.151 0.509*** 0.562*** 
 (0.121) (0.100) (0.147) (0.126) 
SWAP*DAHNGit -0.291** -0.087 -0.331 -0.597** 
 (0.138) (0.171) (0.269) (0.255) 
Log (GDP/capita)it 0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
GGEit 0.024** 0.023** 0.049*** 0.047*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.017) (0.015) 
Log (HIV deaths)it -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 
SWAp countries 
Control countries  
884 
27 
25 
884 
27 
25 
884 
27 
25 
884 
27 
25 
Instruments - - 58 74 
Hansen p-value - - 0.239 0.961 
AR(2) p-value - - 0.262 0.176 
Windmeijer standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01;  year trends included, results suppressed 
for brevity. 
a All models employ two-step estimation, collapsed instrument sets and principal components analysis to further reduce 
instrument numbers.  
b WƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚŵŽĚĞůďĂƐĞĚƵƉŽŶZŽŽĚŵĂŶ ?Ɛ(2009a) guidelines for model selection: 
x Estimate of lagged dependent variable falls within (or close to) coefficient estimates for OLS and fixed effects 
dynamic models presented in columns 1 and 2. 
x Failure to reject Hansen test of over-identification restrictions with p-value that falls within (or near to) desired 
range between 0·1 and 0·25. Note, as Hansen p values get closer to 1·00, suggests too many instruments are 
over-fitting the model.   
x Model should accept the null that there is no 2nd order autocorrelation. 
c Lagged  GHE-S, DAHG, DAHNG treated as endogenous.  
d Lagged  GHE-S, DAHG, DAHNG, SWAp*DAHG, SWAP*DAHNG  treated as endogenous.  
Measurement Error 
As discussed in the Manuscript, Errors in Variables (EIV) models have been run to assess 
the sensitivity of the main findings to an alternative modelling approach designed to remove 
the bias associated with the presence of potential measurement in DAHG, DAHNG and 
consequently DAHG*SWAp and DAHNG*SWAp. We explore this sensitivity running 
additional regressions using the xtewreg Stata commands. The xtewreg command employs 
a two-step GMM estimation of the EIV model using higher-order moments/cumulants of 
residXDOVWRµFRUUHFW¶IRUHUURUVLQRQHRUPRUHRIWKH5+6YDULDEOHV(ULFNVRQ	:KLWHG
2002; Erickson & Whited, 2012; Erickson et al, forthcoming). We use GHE-A as the 
dependent variable to exclude the possibility of mismeasurement on the left hand side 
arising as a consequence of mismeasurement in DAHG. As such, the interpretation of the 
DAHG coefficient is slightly different. When we regress DAHG on GHE-A, we would expect a 
coefficient of 1 (rather than zero for GHE-S) in the event of full additionality of DAHG. 
Because DAHNG is not reflected in government health expenditure, we would expect 
coefficients of 0 for regressions on both GHE-S and GHE-A in the event of full additionality 
for DAHNG.  
This EIV modelling technique is known to be less stable in small samples ± so we conduct 
WKLVDQDO\VLVLQWKHODUJHU³6DPSOH´HVWDEOLVKHGDERYHWRPD[LPLVHOLNHOLKRRGRIPRGHO
stability. In Table B6, we first run a series of EIV regressions in a variation of the main 
specification that excludes the mediating effect of SWAp on crowding out (by excluding the 
SWAp and SWAp-interaction terms). We assume both DAHG and DAHNG are 
mismeasured.  In Table B7 we estimate the main effect of interest incorporating the SWAp 
and SWAp interaction terms, where we assume DAHG, SWAp*DAHG, DAHNG and 
SWAp*DAHNG are mismeasured. xtewreg does not compute fixed effects internally and so, 
for each set of EIV models, we undertake two alternative approaches for controlling for 
country-specific time-invariant factors. First all data is modelled as variations from country 
means (i.e. we demean all data using country-specific means). Second, we use the raw data 
but include country dummy terms. In each table we also present in the first three columns 
results from variants of our main model: (1) fixed effects model using GHE-S as the 
dependent variable (the main model), (2) fixed effects model using GHE-A as the dependent 
variable (main model with different dependent variable), and (3) OLS on demeaned data 
using GHE-A as the dependant variable. In Table B8 we extend the EIV model analyses, 
employing the eivreg Stata command. This approach requires a predetermined level of 
³UHOLDELOLW\´RIDVVXPHGPLVPHDVXUHGYDULDEOHV'$+*'$+1*6:$S'$+*DQG
SWAp*DAHNG). Given levels of reliability are contested and unknown, we test sensitivity of 
main results to differing (but uniform) levels of reliability across mismeasured variables. 
Specifically reliability levels are modelled first at 0.9 and 0.8 (models with lower levels of 
estimated reliability than this are not estimated by eivreg as it does not estimate models 
where the reliability is less than the R2).  
In Table B6 only one model ± Column 8, meets guidelines for model selection (i.e.(a) tau2 
VFRUHVIRUHDFKPLVPHDVXUHGYDULDEOH¶VSUR[\IDOOLQJFORVHWREXWQRWDERYHSUR[\WDX2 
scores should fall between 0 = worthless proxy and 1 = perfect proxy); and (b) non-
significant Sargan/Hansen p-score, which fails to reject the null that the model is 
overidentified). In this model, the extent of displacement of government health expenditure 
remains consistent with a crowding out effect of domestically sourced government health 
expenditure (coefficient is significantly different to 1, p=0.00).  As can be seen in Table B7, 
no EIV model satisfied criteria for model selection ± LQFOXGLQJVRPHPLVPHDVXUHGYDULDEOH¶V
proxies tau2 scores falling outside the plausible range of 0 and 1, so any conclusions drawn 
should be treated with caution. While the magnitude of the SWAp*DAHG effect is sensitive 
to EIV model selection, it is statistically significant in most models and remains qualitatively 
consistent with results from the main model.  Further, Table B8 showed the main 
SWAp*DAHG effect was robust to the differing levels of assumed reliability of mismeasured 
variables.  Nonetheless, the extent of sensitivity around important coefficients in both Tables 
B6 and B7 ± namely DAHG and DAHNG ± suggest results should be treated with some 
caution.1 Given this, it is difficult to conclude that these models have satisfactorily controlled 
for the presence of mismeasurement. Further research is needed to investigate the finite 
sample properties of these estimators when using small N samples to estimate relatively 
complex EIV models in which a number of RHS variables are potentially mismeasured.2  
Whilst on the basis of this robustness analyses, we cannot conclude with full certainty that 
                                               
1 This is not surprising when using small N samples to estimate relatively complex EIV models in which a 
number of RHS variables are potentially mismeasured. Precise estimation of higher-order moments/cumulants 
requires relatively large N and data requirements increase for each additional RHS variable specified as mis-
measured. Moreover, parameter estimates from this approach are potentially sensitive to mis-specification of 
RHS variables as either mis-measured or perfectly measured (Erickson et al, forthcoming). 
2
 While the Erickson & Whited two-step GMM models perform well when estimating 
relatively simple specifications with one mismeasured RHS variable in large N samples 
(Erickson & Whited, 2012), the models estimated here include several RHS variables with 
potentially significant measurement error and our data spans a relatively small N sample over 
the relatively recent period in which (relatively) good quality data have become available. 
Erickson & Whited (2012) QRWHWKDW³0RQWH&DUORH[SHULPHQWVDUHRQOy informative about an 
HVWLPDWRUDWRQHSRLQWLQDSDUDPHWHUVSDFHDQGIRURQHMRLQWGLVWULEXWLRQRIWKHGDWD´DQG
UHFRPPHQG³H[DPLQLQJILQLWHVDPSOHSHUIRUPDQFHLQGDWD-relevant Monte Carlos before 
using them on new data, especially if the sample size differs greatly from the ones we 
FRQVLGHUKHUH´. And so, while our results from Erickson & Whited EIV models demonstrate 
the potential importance of measurement error and the potential value of this approach, 
further work is required before drawing strong conclusions from the sometimes conflicting 
results that arise from these models.     
SWAp has significantly reduced the extent of crowding out, nor can we exclude this effect. 
The extent of mismeasurement remains contested and the data used is argued to have 
made significant gains in accuracy since Van de Sijpe and others first raised these important 
measurement concerns. As such, there appears to be sufficient evidence here to motivate 
further investigation of the potential for SWAp to address the (perceived) threat of DAHG 
displacement of domestically sourced government health expenditure.  
 Table B6. Sensitivity of crowding out models excluding the mediating effHFWVRI6:$SXVLQJDOWHUQDWLYH³(UURUVLQ9DULDEOHV´
modelling approach 
 OLS models EIV models  ? demeaned data EIV models  ? country FE models 
 (1) 
FE 
(2) 
FE 
(3) 
Demeaned 
(4)a 
EIV 3(2) 
(5)b 
EIV 4(2) 
(6)c 
EIV 5(2) 
(7)a 
EIV 3(2) 
(8)b 
EIV 4(2) 
(9)c 
EIV 5(2) 
 GHE-S GHE-A GHE-A GHE-A GHE-A GHE-A GHE-A GHE-A GHE-A 
DAHGit -0.591*** 0.409*** 0.336*** 0.828*** 0.157*** 0.121*** -0.073 0. 441*** 0.120*** 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.100) (0.283) (0.031) (0.008) (0.334) (0.072) (0.017) 
DAHNGit 0.153 0.153 0.168 -0.963 1.192*** -0.267*** 2.362 0.973*** 1.548*** 
 (0.115) (0.115) (0.113) (1.319) (0.178) (0.002) (2.597) (0.116) (0.068) 
Log (GDP/capita)it -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.007* 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
GGEit 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.045*** 0.037*** 0.046*** 0.035* 0.040*** 0.038*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.019) (0.011) (0.011) 
Log (HIV deaths)it -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 
SWAp countries 
Control countries 
tau12d 
tau22 
Sargan/Hansene p- 
   score= 
1742 
27 
70 
 
1742 
27 
70 
 
1742 
27 
70 
 
1742 
27 
70 
0.515(0.275) 
0.056 (0.173) 
 
0.792 
 
1742 
27 
70 
1.730(0.690) 
0.282(0.108) 
 
0.056 
 
1742 
27 
70 
2.840(0.848) 
-0.491(0.433) 
 
0.001 
1742 
27 
70 
-0.737(7.100) 
0.644(0.109) 
 
0.203 
1742 
27 
70 
0.943(0.116) 
0.681(0.087) 
 
0.249 
1742 
27 
70 
1.668(0.435) 
0.663(0.082) 
 
0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; year trends included, results suppressed for brevity. 
a 3rd order moment  and assumes DAHG and DAHNG are mis-measured.  
b 4th order moment  and assumes DAHG and DAHNG are mis-measured. 
c
 5th order moment and assumes DAHG and DAHNG are mis-measured.  
d Tau2 scores should fall within the range 0 and 1, where 0 indicates a worthless proxy and 1 indicates a perfect proxy. Tau2 scores outside that range may indicate the sample size is too small. 
e Sargan Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions of the model. The null is that the model is not overidentified. 
7DEOH%6HQVLWLYLW\RIPDLQUHVXOWVWRDOWHUQDWLYH³(UURUVLQ9DULDEOHV´PRGHOOLQJDSSURDFKXVLQJ6WDWDFRPPDQG[WHZUHJ 
 OLS models EIV models  ? demeaned data EIV models  ? country FE models 
 (1) 
FE 
(2) 
FE 
(3) 
Demeaned 
(4)a 
EIV 3(4) 
(5)b 
EIV 4(4) 
(6)c 
EIV 3(4) 
(7)d 
EIV 4(4) 
 GHE-S GHE-A GHE-A GHE-A GHE-A GHE-A GHE-A 
DAHGit -0.752*** 0.248*** 0.230*** -0.064 0.287*** 0.074 0. 708*** 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.067) (0.295) (0.013) (0.097) (0.022) 
SWApit 0.002 0.002 0.004*** 0.004** 0.004*** 0.003 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
SWAp*DAHGit 0.519*** 0.519*** 0.448*** 0.381 0.720*** 0.236*** 0.188*** 
 (0.122) (0.122) (0.157) (0.294) (0.020) (0.098) (0.019) 
DAHNGit 0.083 0.083 0.108 -0.008 0.269*** 0.508*** -1.238** 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.101) (0.122) (0.026) (0.106) (0.063) 
SWAP*DAHNGit -0.084 -0.084 -0.027 0.650*** -0.429*** 0.135 0.997*** 
 (0.193) (0.193) (0.170) (0.141) (0.021) (0.129) (0. 047) 
Log (GDP/capita)it -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.005* 0.004 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
GGEit 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.048*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) 
Log (HIV deaths)it -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 
SWAp countries 
Control countries 
tau12d 
tau22 
tau32 
tau42 
Sargan/Hansene p- 
   score= 
1742 
27 
70 
 
1742 
27 
70 
 
1742 
27 
70 
 
1742 
27 
70 
-3.094(15.24) 
6.624(93.29) 
1.494(0.7) 
0.367(0.33) 
 
0.435 
1742 
27 
70 
0.674(0.164) 
0.786(0.28) 
0.665(0.18) 
0.716(0.24) 
 
0.000 
1742 
27 
70 
2.248(2.184) 
1.553(0.475) 
0.720(0.128) 
0.240(1.134) 
 
0.599 
1742 
27 
70 
0.836(0.082) 
0.947(0.214) 
0.676(0.074) 
1.057(0.064) 
 
0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; year trends included, results suppressed for brevity. 
a 3rd order moment  and assumes DAHG, DAHNG, SWAp*DAHG  and SWAp*DAHNG are mis-measured.  
b 4th order moment  and assumes DAHG, DAHNG, SWAp*DAHG  and SWAp*DAHNG. 
c
 5th order moment and assumes DAHG, DAHNG, SWAp*DAHG  and SWAp*DAHNG.  
d Tau2 scores should fall within the range 0 and 1, where 0 indicates a worthless proxy and 1 indicates a perfect proxy. Tau2 scores outside that range may indicate the sample size is too small. 
e Sargan Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions of the model. The null is that the model is not overidentified. 
7DEOH%6HQVLWLYLW\RIPDLQUHVXOWVWRDOWHUQDWLYH³(UURUVLQ9DULDEOHV´PRGHOOLQJDSSURDFKXVLQJ6WDWDFRPPDQGHLYUHJ 
 Models with no SWAp or SWAp interactions Models with SWAp and SWAp interactions 
 Demeaned data modelsa Country fixed effects modelsb Demeaned data modelsa Country fixed effects modelsb 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 rc=0.9 
GHE-A 
rc=0.8 
GHE-A 
rc=0.9 
GHE-A 
rc=0.8 
GHE-A 
rd=0.9 
GHE-A 
rd=0.8 
GHE-A 
rd=0.9 
GHE-A 
rd=0.8 
GHE-A 
DAHGit 0.375*** 0.425*** 0.591*** 0.906 0.265*** 0.313*** 0.402*** 0.762*** 
 (0.030) (0.034) (0.042) (0.063) (0.033) (0.039) (0.049) (0.098) 
SWApit - - - - 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002* 0.002*** 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SWAp*DAHGit - - - - 0.415*** 0.370*** 0.461*** 0.216** 
     (0.067) (0.070) (0.064) (0.092) 
DAHNGit 0.183*** 0.202*** 0.250*** 0.251*** 0.128** 0.156** 0.200** 0.284 
 (0.048) (0.055) (0.060) (0.089) (0.059) (0.074) (0.081) (0.179) 
SWAP*DAHNGit - - - - -0.043 -0.067 -0.116 -0.143 
     (0.092) (0.100) (0.104) (0.177) 
Log (GDP/capita)it 0.000 0.000 0.005*** 0.006*** -0.000 0.000 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GGEit 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.040*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Log (HIV deaths)it -0.001** -0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 
SWAp countries 
Control countries 
1742 
27 
70 
1742 
27 
70 
1742 
27 
70 
1742 
27 
70 
1742 
27 
70 
1742 
27 
70 
1742 
27 
70 
1742 
27 
70 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; year trends included, results suppressed for brevity. 
a Country time invariant factors controlled by demeaning data with country specific means. 
b Country time invariant factors controlled by inclusion of country dummies. 
c Estimated reliability of assumed mismeasured variables (DAHG and DAHNG) 
d Estimated reliability of assumed mismeasured variables (DAHG, DAHNG, SWAp*DAHG and SWAp*DAHNG)   
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Table B9. Sensitivity of results to alternative HIV indicators (in log) (including data 
source)  
 (1) 
HIV deaths 
(IHME) 
(2) 
HIV prevalence 
(World Bank) 
(3) 
HIV prevalencea 
(IHME) 
(4) 
HIV prevalencea 
(IHME) 
 GHE-S GHE-S GHE-S GHE-S 
DAHGit -0.779*** -0.801*** -0.787*** -0.779*** 
 (0.061) (0.066) (0.056) (0.061) 
SWApit 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
SWAp*DAHGit 0.518*** 0.593*** 0.690** 0.518*** 
 (0.123) (0.127) (0.326) (0.122) 
DAHNG 0.124 0.119 0.089 0.123 
 (0.103) (0.126) (0.140) (0.102) 
SWAP*DAHNG -0.084 -0.147 -0.083 -0.084 
 (0.198) (0.212) (0.365) (0.198) 
Log (GDP/capita) it -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
GGEit 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.038*** 0.029*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Log (HIV burden) it 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
     
N 
SWAp countries 
Control countries 
936 
27 
25 
846 
25 
22 
208 
27 
25 
935 
27 
25 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; year trends included, results suppressed for brevity. 
a IHME HIV prevalence data estimates available include observations in 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2013. Column 4 
imputes observations for these missing values by interpolating linear trends between observed years.  
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FIGURE B2. Sensitivity to variations of SWAp commencement and exclusion of each 
SWAp 
 
Figure B2 plots the re-estimated coefficients for the SWAp interaction with DAHG. As can be 
seen the estimated protective effect of SWAp presented in the paper (reducing the extent of 
displacement by $0.52) is robust to plausible variation in each SWAps commencement, 
including commencing all SWAps one year earlier and one year later. The finding appears 
most sensitive to the exclusion of the Solomon Islands SWAp and of more concern given the 
subsequent reduced effect size, the exclusion of the Lesotho and Mozambique SWAps. 
However, the replacement effect of increasing DAHG via SWAp when these countries were 
individually and then both excluded remained significant, all with p values less than 0.01. 
This analysis gives confidence that the significant effect of SWAp on the displacement effect 
of DAHG is robust to plausible variation in SWAp commencement uncertainty and not driven 
by the misclassification of any individual SWAp country. 
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C. Testing the common trends assumption  
To test adherence to the common trends assumption requires ± at a minimum ± ability to 
compare GHE-S trends in the treatment (SWAp implementing) and control group over a lead 
up period, prior to any included SWAp uptake. Unfortunately, the WHO GHE-A data used in 
the main analyses commences in 1995, whilst the first SWAps included in this analysis 
FRPPHQFHGLQZKHQ³SUHSDUDWLRQWR6:$SUHVSRQVHV´PD\DOUHDG\KDYHEHFRPH
observable (as it appears in the evolving SWAp effect analyses).   To address this limitation 
and thereby enable some comparisons of pre-Swap uptake GHE-S trends we employed an 
alternative public health expenditure data from the International Food Policy Research 
Institute and constructed a panel from 1990 to 1996 for analysis (IFPRI 2015). A limitation of 
this approach is that sufficient data was only available for 24 of our main sample countries 
(both groups had a number of countries represented). Nonetheless, it does enable some 
assessment of the presence of pre-existing differences in trends between the treatment 
(SWAp countries) and control groups prior to any included SWAp implementation. With this 
alternative dataset, two tests were undertaken to assess adherence to the common trends 
assumption.  An amended version of Equation (1) was estimated, however the SWAp and 
SWAp*DAH interaction terms were replaced by (i) SWAp*time interaction to identify the 
time-trend in the SWAp group; and (ii) a SWAp dummy that introduced a fake SWAp to all 
SWAp group countries in 1993. In both tests, support for adherence to the common trends 
assumption requires no significant effect associated with the respective SWAp identifier 
variable.  
As can be seen in Table C1 below, the magnitude of the displacement effect of DAHG on 
GHE-S in the pre-SWAp period 1990 to 1996 was larger than that estimated by this present 
paper and the more recent Dieleman et al (2013) paper, though the estimate is consistent 
with upper limits of Lu, Schneider et al. (2010) and thus may reflect the limitations of some of 
these older data point estimates as well as being influenced by the smaller set of countries.  
Notwithstanding the data limitations, the DAHG displacement estimates are qualitatively 
consistent with estimates from the observed period of 1995 to 2012 presented in the paper. 
Most importantly, there was no observed difference in the pre-SWAp uptake GHE-S trends 
between the treatment and control groups (column 1, Table C1) nor did the fake SWAp 
identify any effective difference between the two (column 2, Table C1). So, whilst data 
limitations mean uncertainties remain, these tests provide support that the common trends 
assumption holds.  
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TABLE C1. Tests of the GHE-S trends of SWAp and control group between 1990 to 
1996 (prior to SWAp uptake)a  
 (1) (2) 
 GHE-Sb  GHE-Sb 
DAHGit -0.947*** -0.946*** 
 (0.034) (0.035) 
SWAp-group (linear trend)it -0.000 - 
 (0.000) - 
Fake-SWApit - -0.001 
 - (0.001) 
DAHNGit -0.414* -0.418* 
 (0.203) (0.206) 
Log (GDP/capita)it -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Log (HIV deaths)it -0.002* -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
N 
SWAp countries 
Control countries 
159 
15 
9 
159 
15 
9 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Year trends included, results suppressed for brevity. 
a Note: general government non-health expenditure has been excluded from this specification as it also had no 
observations prior to 1995. 
b It was uncertain from accompanying notes if IFPRI (2015) estimates of public health expenditure included 
DAHG (ie. Whether it was GHE-S or GHE-A). Re-running the main model (from1995 to 2012) with the IFPRI GHE 
data with and without DAHG first subtracted indicated that their estimates likely included DAHG (GHE-A). Thus 
the results presented in Table C1 include the regression in which DAHG has first been subtracted from GHE 
data (to measure GHE-S). 
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D. Robustness of poorest subgroup analysis  
Table D1. Robustness of poorest subgroup analysis to alternative POOREST sample  
 (1) 
Poorest Sample  
'W ?ĐĂƉŝƚĂч
$365ab 
(2) 
Sample 2 
'W ?ĐĂƉŝƚĂч ? ? ? ?b 
 GHE-S GHE-S 
DAHGit -0.860*** -0.855*** 
 (0.063) (0.062) 
SWApit 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
SWAp*DAHGit 0.543*** 0.517*** 
 (0.093) (0.090) 
DAHNGit 0.127 0.102 
 (0.155) (0.154) 
SWAP*DAHNGit -0.143 -0.073 
 (0.232) (0.227) 
Log (GDP/capita)it -0.007** -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
GGEit 0.028** 0.025* 
 (0.012) (0.013) 
Log (HIV deaths)it -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
N 
SWAp countries 
Control countries 
504 
17 
11 
558 
18 
13 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; year trends included, results suppressed for brevity. 
a Result presented in paper.  
b at baseline. 
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Table D2. Robustness of subgroup analysis of underlying corruption to alternative 
threshold.  
 Baseline control of corruption threshold 
score of -0.76  
Baseline control of corruption threshold 
score of -0.96a  
 (1) 
Poorer control of 
corruption 
(2) 
Stronger control of 
corruption 
(3) 
Poorer control of 
corruption 
(4) 
Stronger control of 
corruption 
 GHE-S  GHE-S  GHE-S  GHE-S  
DAHGit -0.798*** -0.762*** -0.807*** -0.765*** 
 (0.064) (0.105) (0.072) (0.094) 
SWApit 0.005** 0.004*** 0.003* 0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
SWAp*DAHGit 0.253 0.544*** 0.038 0.565*** 
 (0.210) (0.140) (0.156) (0.137) 
DAHNGit 0.135 0.141 -0.099 0.190** 
 (0.205) (0.086) (0.237) (0.092) 
SWAP*DAHNGit 0.408* -0.308 0.516* -0.220 
 (0.213) (0.215) (0.264) (0.219) 
Log (GDP/capita)it -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
GGEit 0.032* 0.024*** 0.044*** 0.023*** 
 (0.016) (0.006) (0.014) (0.007) 
Log (HIV deaths)it -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
N 
SWAp countries 
Control countries 
396 
9 
13 
540 
18 
12 
306 
7 
10 
630 
20 
15 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; year trends included, results suppressed for brevity. 
a Alternative threshold reflected an obvious break in baseline corruption index scores in the SWAp group.  
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